I
n 1984, continued double-digit inflation in Medicare Part B physician expenditures led Congress to impose a fee freeze on Medicare services. Originally, the freeze was to last fifteen months, from July 1, 1984 to September 30, 1985 . Congress extended the freeze, however, until May 1986 for participating physicians and through the end of 1986 for nonparticipants. (Participating physicians are those who have agreed to accept all of their Medicare patients on assignment.) 1 Critics warned that physicians would be less willing to provide services when real fees were constrained, resulting in diminished access to care for the elderly and disabled beneficiaries of Medicare during the freeze. 2 Congress, on the other hand, was concerned about a different response to price controls-namely, that physicians would provide more services to maintain target income levels-and mandated a study by the Department of Health and Human Services.
This article seeks to examine what really happened during the freeze. What was the year-to-year increase in Part B physician spending during this time period? Can we identify an increase in expenditures above and beyond that resulting from a growing number of Medicare enrollees? If prices are frozen, then spending per beneficiary can go up only if volume is increasing, that is, if physicians are providing more services, or if they are providing a more expensive kind of service: for example, longer, more comprehensive visits or computerized axial tomography (CT) scans instead of more routine x-rays.
Here we describe trends in Medicare physician spending during the fee freeze, but it is important to remember that other policy changes were occurring at the same time. (Since the freeze was national in scope, furthermore, no control group of physicians treating Medicare patients was available for comparison.) Probably the most important of these simultaneous changes was the implementation of the prospective payment system (PPS) for Medicare with payment determined by diagnosisrelated groups (DRGs). Phase-in of PPS had begun in October 1983, but a disproportionate number of hospitals first came on in July 1984, when the freeze also went into effect. PPS transition continued throughout the freeze period, furthermore, as hospitals received DRG payments increasingly based on the federal, as opposed to hospital-specific, rates.
In addition, two other changes occurred at this time. First, direct billing for laboratory services was implemented in July 1984. This prevented physicians from billing for any lab tests that they do not personally provide in their offices. Second, the participating physician program began around the same time (October 1, 1984). Physicians were encouraged to sign the participation agreement and accept all patients on assignment, because they were promised a larger fee update after the freeze.
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Study Methods
To study the impact of the freeze, we drew upon some unique primary data: a cross-section, time series based on calendar years 1983 to 1986. This provided an eighteen-month baseline prior to the freeze, as well as nine months before PPS. The original study design included a long postfreeze time period as well, but political events overtook research when Congress decided to extend the freeze.
Over the past five years, the Part B carriers have been converting from their unique procedure coding terminologies for physician services to a uniform system for Medicare based on the American Medical Association's Current Procedural Terminology-Fourth Edition (CPT-4). No national physician data were available that had consistent procedure coding throughout the study period. Consistent terminology over time was important because of the interest in possible "upcoding," that is, the propensity of physicians to redefine their services to more complex codes with higher associated reimbursements.
We identified four states that had used the CPT-4 coding system throughout the study period: Alabama, Connecticut, Washington, and Wisconsin. All Medicare physician claims were obtained from these states for each of the four years. While these states constitute only four out of fifty, they also were chosen to represent the four major geographic regions. Furthermore, as we show below, trends in expenditures for these four states mirror those for the United States as a whole. Our results are based on pooled claims data from all four states. Both expenditure and volume data are presented per Medicare beneficiary, so that any observed changes will have held increases in Part B enrollment constant.
What Happened To Medicare Spending
Time trends in physician expenditures, Spending per Medicare beneficiary increased steadily over calendar years 1983 to 1986 (as shown by the top line in Exhibit 1). By 1986, Medicare and its beneficiaries were spending 29.5 percent more for physician services than three years before. This amounted to a $132 increase, up from $450 annually in 1983 to $582 in 1986. These increases are comparable to the 27.1 percent growth experienced for the Medicare program as a whole. 3 If we calculate the growth for our four states by quarter, the increase would be even greater: 35.5 percent from the first quarter in 1983 to the last quarter in 1986. Even during the period in which fees were frozen for all physicians (July 1984-May 1986), the growth in spending was 26.5 percent.
Of course, part of the expenditure increase from 1983 to 1986 reflects the two reasonable charge updates made during this time period, the first in July 1983 and the second in May 1986 (the latter for participating physicians only). We constructed a Medicare physician price index and used this to calculate a price-adjusted measure of quantity of physician services (as shown by the bottom line in Exhibit 1). The adjusted quantity increased 22.1 percent, implying that volume growth and the substitution of more expensive for less expensive services account for three-quarters (74.9 percent, or 22.1 divided by 29.5) of the total spending increase. From Exhibit 1, we can see that there is a tendency for spending to fall off somewhat in the fourth quarter of each year, as patients defer surgery and hospitalization until after the holidays. In 1984, spending fell in the third quarter (July-September) and remained lower through the end of the year. This drop was due to a reduction in lab tests, as the direct billing requirement was implemented, and to a reduction in hospital visits, as hospital admissions declined.
Exhibit 2 displays changes in expenditures per beneficiary for each of Because surgery is the single largest type of service, accounting for more than one-third of the Medicare physician dollar, increases in spending here have a disproportionate impact on total Medicare outlays. Expenditures on surgical services increased 35 percent from 1983 to 1986, adding about $55 to the "cost" of care for every enrollee, far more than any other kind of service. Increases in spending may be due to more operations and/ or to a shift in the mix of procedures, that is, more expensive operations. We examine this in detail later.
As surgical expenditures rose, so did spending on anesthesia services, increasing 30 percent over four years. Expenditures on surgical assistance grew rapidly from 1983 to 1985, and then actually fell more than 6 percent in 1986. This decline was due almost entirely to a sharp reduction in the use of assistant surgeons during cataract surgery. (Mandatory prepayment screens for assistants at lens procedures were implemented at this time.)
Spending for radiology services rose 36 percent, increasing from $56 per beneficiary in 1983 to $76 in 1986. This may reflect a combination of both more x-rays and more expensive ones, such as CT scans and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Some of the increase may be more apparent than real, furthermore. When x-rays are provided in the office, the physician may bill for both the technical component (actually performing the x-ray) and the interpretation; only the less expensive "interpretation only" bills are permitted in the hospital and outpatient settings, however.
Although spending for laboratory tests declined beginning in July 1984 as the direct billing requirement was implemented, nominal expenditures nearly regained their pre-1984 levels by 1986. It is widely believed that physicians have since expanded their in-office testing capability. 4 Thus, the short-term decline in lab expenditures during 1983-1986 probably will not persist over the long run.
Spending on specialized tests grew at a faster rate than any other type of service (except the residual nonclassifiable category), increasing 67 percent in four years. 5 Specialized tests include a wide range of services such as pulmonary function test, allergy testing, electroencephalograms (EEGs), and so on, but diagnostic cardiac services account for the majority of expenditures. Cardiac services include routine electrocardiograms (EKGs), cardiovascular stress tests, Holter monitors, echocardiography, and the like.
Exhibit 3 decomposes the $133 growth in spending per beneficiary into its components by service type. Increased spending on surgical services was the most important factor, accounting for 41 percent of the growth. Medical care and radiology each were responsible for one-sixth of the increase, but medical care was an important contributor only because it accounts for a larger share of the physician pie overall.
Increased spending for specialized tests was responsible for almost 11 percent of the expenditure growth. It is noteworthy that only 5 percent of PHYSICIAN FEE FREEZE 27 the Medicare physician dollar was spent on these tests in 1986; they are contributing far more than their "fair share" to the Part B increase. The remaining types of service account for a relatively small amount of the increase.
Time
The volume increase in lens procedures (cataract surgery) was dramatic, jumping 50 percent over the time period. Spending increased even faster (61 percent) due to changes in the mix of lens procedures, particularly a substitution of one-stage (extraction plus insertion of intraocular lens) for extraction-only operations. Utilization rates for total knee replacements and coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery also grew markedly (39 percent and 19 percent, respectively), with more modest increases for inguinal hernia repair and total hip replacement. As ex- Rates for some surgical procedures actually declined over time, as seen in Exhibit 4. In the case of permanent pacemaker insertion and carotid thromboendarterectomy, declining utilization may have been due to growing doubts about their medical necessity and clinical effectiveness. 6 In terms of absolute rates of increase, however, almost nothing compares with diagnostic surgical procedures. Colonoscopy rates more than doubled over the time period, while those for sigmoidoscopy actually tripled. In fact, colonoscopy is second only to lens procedures in its impact on surgical spending, accounting for almost 10 percent of the growth. Analysis of quarterly data (not shown) found an extraordinarily high jump in the latter half of 1985, presumably in response to the cancer detected by colonoscopy in President Reagan in late 1985. It is noteworthy, however, that rates continued to climb throughout 1986; there is no indication that they will return to pre-presidential levels.
Utilization rates for proctosigmoidoscopy, the simplest of these endoscopic procedures for the lower gastrointestinal (GI) tract, have fallen over time. Since this procedure is the least expensive of the three, the dollar savings have been small: a reduction of twenty cents per beneficiary from 1983 to 1986, which is offset by a fifty-cent increase for sigmoidoscopy and an increase of more than five dollars for colonoscopy.
The shift to outpatient care. Physician services have shifted dramatically, out of the hospital and into outpatient settings over the study period, a trend due largely to declining admission rates and declining lengths-of-stay under PPS. While almost two-thirds of the Medicare physician dollar was spent in the hospital in 1983, that had fallen to just under one-half in 1986. By contrast, the percent of spending in the physician's office rose from 29 to 33 percent, while the share spent in outpatient departments and ambulatory surgical centers almost tripled from 6 percent to 15 percent (See S. Leader and M. Moon, "Medicare Trends in Ambulatory Surgery," in this volume of Health ").
The shift from inpatient to outpatient settings occurred for all types of services. Exhibit 5 displays the number of visits per beneficiary, separately by type of visit: office, hospital, other (primarily nursing home visits), and consultations. Although technically not considered visits, consultations are similar to, and may substitute for, comprehensive new patient visits.
As expected, there has been a definite substitution of office for hospital visits. The average beneficiary made 2.9 office visits and 2.9 hospital visits in 1983; by 1986, he or she saw the physician 3.5 times in the office and received 2.3 visits in the hospital. Note, however, that the substitution has been perfectly offsetting; the total number of office and hospital visits per enrollee has not changed over, the time period. The average beneficiary received 5.8 office and hospital visits, both in 1983 and in 1986. Visits in other settings and consultations did increase slightly, so that total physician contacts show a net gain over time.
Total outlays for those visits and consultations increased almost 17 percent over the same time period, however. While Medicare and its beneficiaries enjoyed 21 percent more office visits in 1986 than in 1983, they paid 36 percent more for them. Similarly, while hospital visit rates declined 21 percent over the time period, spending fell only 7 percent.
How can expenditures increase so much more rapidly than volume, especially when fees were frozen for most of this period? While the fee updates explain about one-half of the price per visit increase, the other half is due to "upcoding:" a shift in procedure code mix toward more complex, and more lucrative, visit codes. In 1983, for example, minimal and brief follow-up office visits accounted for 39 percent of all office visits; by 1986, they accounted for only 21 percent. By contrast, the proportion of limited follow-up visits grew from 29 percent to 36 percent, and that for intermediate visits from 20 to 29 percent.
While evidence of "upcoding" is indisputable, this does not necessarily imply fraudulent billing practices on the part of physicians. At least some of the shifts in procedure code mix may be due to real case-mix changes resulting from PPS. With declining admission rates and shorter stays, hospital patients may be sicker and the average hospital visit, more complex. Similarly, with earlier discharges, office patients may be more complicated and require longer visits. Furthermore, with eleven different codes for office visits and nine for hospital visits, there may be real uncertainty among physicians regarding the appropriate code in all cases. Time trends in spending by specialty. Up until now, we have examined changes in expenditures for selected services and procedures, but specialty-specific trends are also of interest. Do all specialties show similar rates of change over time, or are expenditures growing faster for some specialties than for others? Exhibit 6 compares total spending per beneficiary by specialty for each of the years in our time series. The specialties listed here, while not exhaustive, account for over 95 percent of Medicare expenditures on physician services. By comparing the specialty-specific percentage changes (in the last column) with that for all physicians (29.5 percent), we can see at a glance for which specialties spending has been growing at faster rates than for others.
Expenditures have grown most rapidly for gastroenterologists, where spending per beneficiary has increased a remarkable 73 percent over our short time series. Medicare outlays also have risen faster for ophthalmologists (57 percent), dermatologists (53 percent), cardiologists (49 percent), What were physicians doing to drive up expenditures for their services? In the case of ophthalmologists, for example, over one-half of the growth was due to increased spending on cataract surgery. Exhibit 7 decomposes the spending increases for cardiologists. Almost one-third was due to the increased number of cardiac catheterizations performed, and another third to more visits and consultations. The remaining one-third was due to increased diagnostic tests, especially echocardiography (10 percent of the total growth) and EKGs (7.6 percent).
Policy Implications
Our data show that physician spending increased disproportionately for three types of services: surgery, radiology, and special diagnostic tests. Together these services accounted for two-thirds of the expenditure growth from 1983 to 1986. An increase in volume in response to the fee freeze is a real possibility. The increases generally took place among services that physicians, rather than patients, initiated. The appropriateness of many x-rays and specialized tests such as echocardiography and cardiac monitoring, for example, is difficult for patients to evaluate. It is also noteworthy that increased surgical volume was observed frequently among those procedures that are considered "overpaid" relative to the physician effort involved in performing them, such as cataract operations, coronary artery bypass graft surgery, and upper GI endoscopy. 7 There are other possible explanations for increased volume during the fee freeze, however. One of these is the impact that PPS may have had on Part B expenditures. PPS has encouraged hospitals and physicians to shift x-rays and other diagnostic tests to office settings where, because of the way that Part B pays for services relative to Part A, the Part B share of the cost is higher. 8 Physicians with in-office testing equipment, furthermore, have fee-for-service incentives to perform more tests. This is not the case for surgery, where physicians are paid the same amount, regardless of location. Technology diffusion, however, may be partly responsible for increased surgical volume. Cardiac catheterization facilities and fiberoptic endoscopes are probably more widely available now than at the beginning of our time series. Of course, given the availability of these procedures, the freeze could have encouraged the increased use of new technology. Or, alternatively, the freeze might have encouraged physicians to purchase the equipment in the first place to maximize their revenues.
A final possible factor is increased patient demand due to a reduction in the real price of care. The net (out-of-pocket) price faced by Medicare beneficiaries has fallen over time in real terms due to the freeze itself as well as to increased assignment rates (which lower the amount of potential balance-billing). Given the relatively inelastic demand for physician services, however, this could explain only a small part of the increase. 9 More research may help shed some light on these issues, but we may never be able to trace the direction of causality. The simultaneous implementation of multiple Medicare payment policies and the absence of a control group mitigate against definitive conclusions. In any event, it is important to note that, in contrast to William Baumol's dire predictions, the fee freeze did not reduce access to care for Medicare beneficiaries. 10 If access to care is measured by the volume of services, then access may even have improved. 
